12
What is left? This paper argues that the focus of the solution needs to shift from the macro to the micro. In essence, this disease has been separated from the patient, the homeowner. Only when we cure the homeowner's ills will we begin to kill the virus that has caused the spread of the zombie mortgage.
Part I briefly defines and differentiates between stalled and abandoned foreclosures and zombie loans. Part II discusses how a homeowner might successfully return a property to the lender through bankruptcy when a lender refuses to foreclose. The options are limited, as the reader will soon discover. Part III explores some of the possible legal theories left to homeowners through the lens of Kathleen's case, a particular zombie foreclosure. Communities need to join forces with homeowners to improve how the law deals with zombie mortgages. So long as it remains profitable to do so, the lending industry will continue to abandon foreclosures and create zombie mortgages. Zombie mortgages will only die when it is no longer profitable to abandon the foreclosure. The courts can assist by creating negative incentives. If a creditor's 10 acts manifest intent to abandon their obligations under a mortgage, courts should consider it abandoned, and eliminate the benefits as well. Only then will creditors be motivated to act on their rights in a timely fashion, least they lose them. While a recovering housing market may assist in moving the current batch of abandoned foreclosures back on the market, it comes too late for most of these homes. They are no longer marketable. It is likely we will not have to wait long before the next housing crisis. 13 We are best advised to create some solutions for this crisis before we are in the midst of the next.
See, i.e. Creola Johnson, Fight Blight: Cities Sue to Hold Lenders Responsible for the Rise in Foreclosures and

I. HOW TO IDENTIFY A ZOMBIE
The terms "abandoned foreclosure" and "zombie mortgage" have been used interchangeably in the literature. In this paper the two are distinguished because they present different challenges. Not all abandoned foreclosures result in an abandoned property. In a 2010 study of abandoned foreclosures, the governmental accounting office found that people tend to abandon their property if the foreclosure has been initiated and the bank fails to follow-through and not if the foreclosure is never initiated, despite a default by the borrower. 14 The logical explanation for this is that people abandon their property because they believe it has been lost in foreclosure. In 2012 the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System responded to the by issuing guidance to lenders regarding when and how they should discontinue a foreclosure. Specifically, the guidance encourages lenders to notify homeowners and communities when they abandoned a foreclosure in order to avoid the incidents of abandoned properties. Compliance with that guidance is spotty at best. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau found it "'extremely common' for servicers to charge off low-balance loans and not notify borrows or municipalities if they did not complete the foreclosure." 16 Currently, there is no law or regulation preventing a lender from initiating and then abandoning a foreclosure.
In fact, the existing guidance available to lenders may be complicating the situation. For example, the Truth in Lending Act requires servicers to send monthly statements to any borrower who has a delinquent mortgage debt. 17 Lori Maggiano, an official with the CFPB, opined that this provision may be pushing "servicers to release the borrower from liability for the debt,"
without expressing the clear effects on the corresponding lien. 18 No one is particularly troubled when a lender chooses never to foreclose and the homeowner remains in the home throughout the process. 22 Although this may be an abandoned foreclosure and ultimately both the lender and homeowner may suffer harm, it appears to be a consensual relationship between two contracting parties. The abandoned foreclosures of concern are those in which the lender initiates, but fails to complete the foreclosure. While easier to document in judicial foreclosure states, 23 the phenomena is being reported in non-judicial states as well. 24 These abandoned foreclosures often result in abandoned properties. They pose a number of problems for the homeowner and the community.
A lender will rarely tell an individual homeowner that the foreclosure has been abandoned, despite the federal guidance requiring such notice. 25 As a result, the homeowner often leaves the residence mistakenly believing that title to the home has passed to the bank. lender typically decides not to proceed with foreclosures for economic reasons. 26 As one Federal
Reserve economist put it, "It may cost more to cure the back taxes and bring the property up to code than they could ever get from selling the property itself." 27 In addition, there are significant costs in owing the property. 28 A lender's ability to repackage the loan and sell it back into the market provides another incentive to abandon a nonperforming mortgage loan.
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There are a number of ways in which a lender can abandon a foreclosure. It was not uncommon to have the foreclosure sale cancelled multiple times, only to be held years after the foreclosure. For that reason, some of these cases may be stalled and not abandoned. 43 While the percentages of foreclosures that fall into this category appear small, they translate into many homes. In 2010 at least 133 foreclosures in 2 of 92 Indiana counties were stalled or abandoned. If you have even similar numbers over the other 90 counties and the remaining nearly twenty years of the mortgage crisis in Indiana, it is easy to see that Indiana has tens of thousands of abandoned foreclosures. 44 And this is just Indiana. The numbers are greater in states like Florida, New York and New Jersey.
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It is impossible to trace whether all of these abandoned foreclosures have now become abandoned properties because not all municipalities record their abandoned properties.
However, research has shown that an increase in foreclosure activity corresponds with an increase in abandoned properties. An abandoned foreclosure is a nasty problem to solve, but a real zombie mortgage is an even more damaging character. This paper will focus on two iterations of the zombie mortgage.
The first is when a homeowner tenders a deed in lieu of foreclosure or the lender purchases the home from the deed of trust's trustee and the lender never records the property transfer. The homeowner has taken action to complete a transfer, but the lender or trustee under the deed of trust fails to take the additional steps to transfer title to the property. The homeowner remains in 43 The data was collected from doxpop, an online docket service and Odyssey, Indiana's state court online docket, during the months of March and April, 2015. the owner with all the corresponding rights and responsibilities. These situations are nearly impossible to trace empirically. We are left to rely on antidotal evidence provided by consumers. 47 The second type of zombie mortgage occurs when a lender forecloses and then months or even years later goes back to the judicial body and sets aside the judgment, re-instating the note. 48 Notice, if sent at all, is sent to the property address. This is essentially no notice to the homeowner because the property has been abandoned, and the lender usually knows this.
Evidence of this zombie mortgages can be found throughout the judicial records. Returning to the study group, 318, or 10%, of the foreclosure judgments were later vacated by the bank. As chart III below demonstrates, when you combine the stalled, abandoned and zombie foreclosures in St. Joseph and Allen Counties, Indiana you get a bleak picture of the housing recovery, but one that closely tracks RealtyTrac's pronouncements. At least 25% of all the foreclosures filed in these counties in 2010 have entered this netherworld.
49 47 See, i.e. Christie, supra note 41 (a homeowner who was told on Christmas Eve that she must move from her home after offering a deed in lieu. She moved, but the bank never proceeded with the transfer). 48 For an extensive discussion of these, See, Fox, supra note 29 at 43-62. 49 The number is likely larger. The 200 dismissals is out of a possible 725 total dismissals. Some of these are the result of settlements reached in the Indiana foreclosure mediation program. Unfortunately, there are not accurate statistics, nor are the settlements reflected on the court docket sheets. I chose to use the one year cutoff because it is unlikely that a loan modification or payoff would have occurred after that much time. Therefore, it is likely that more than 200 are actually abandoned foreclosures. Before beginning to address the strategies to assist homeowners it is important to recognize the harms caused by stalled, abandoned and zombie foreclosures. A conversation with any of these homeowners will make one thing very clear: the situation is very stressful. There are tangible damages as well. Multiple reports in the media have documented the surprise homeowners experience when discovering they were fined for failing to maintain a property they did not know they owned. 50 Interest and fees continues to accrue on the property, but the lender will not accept any money to reduce the debt. Home owner association fees continue to accumulate. 51 Research has shown that credit scores are reduced and stay reduced for a number 50 See i.e. Saulny, supra note 30 (story of Mercy, a homeowner who was being charged with the cost of demolishing a building after she had agreed to the foreclosure and received notice of the sheriff's sale that never actually occurred); Livingston, supra note 41 (story of Renetta who thought she had lost her home only to be billed, 5 years later, for over $12,000 in demolition costs to restructure or repay all or a portion of his debts. 56 As part of that plan, section 1322(a) of the bankruptcy code allows a debtor to surrender a secured property to the creditor. 57 Unfortunately, "surrender does not divest a debtor of ownership and its obligations." 58 The creditor can chose whether or not to accept surrender. If it does, it will proceed either to foreclosure on the property or to work out some other transfer of title. If it does not, the property remains the responsibility of the homeowner.
Bankruptcy is grounded in the notion of a fresh start and sometimes the transfer of the property is needed for that fresh start. If this is the case, homeowners are best advised to do more than simply surrender the property. Instead, homeowners should seek the relief offered by of the creditor. 63 Rosa became the first case to hold that a debtor could transfer the property back to the creditor as part of its chapter 13 bankruptcy plan, but it was not the last. 64 In re Watt soon followed. 65 The Watt judge took the Rosa analysis one step further.
While the court in Rosa had allowed for the transfer of title, it did so only because it had deemed consent on the part of the creditor when the creditor failed to object to the plan after proper notice. 66 The Court in Watt found that consent was not necessary. 67 Instead, it relied on the statute to find that the plan vesting the property in the name of the creditor must be approved so long as it is offered in good faith. 68 Not all bankruptcy courts have agreed with this analysis. 69 However, the language of the code is clear and the use of this section of the code is sure to increase.
Because all bankruptcy courts may not accept their ability to vest the property in the creditor as part of the bankruptcy plan, some homeowners will need to look to other portions of the code for relief. Bankruptcy courts are courts in equity. As such, they can use their equity to further the goal of a bankruptcy proceeding: providing a fresh start for the debtor. 70 In Pigg v.
BAC Home Loans Serving the court used its equitable power in order to order the Trustee to sell the property. 71 11 U.S.C. §363(f) allows the bankruptcy court to order the sale of bankruptcy assets free and clear of liens if certain conditions are met. 72 Like the court in Rosa, the Pigg court found that the lender's inaction in the case constituted consent to the sale. 73 The justification for the action in the two cases, however, was quite different. According to the court in Pigg, "equity demands that the court fashion a remedy that balances the rights of the lienholders and the right of a debtor to a fresh start." 74 As with Section 1322, not all courts agree about the breathe of their equitable power. The courts in both In re Fritsoe and in re Arsenault rejected the notion that their equitable power allowed them to order the sale of the property or to compel the creditor to accept title.
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Bankruptcy may well provide the best means to defeat a zombie mortgage.
Unfortunately, not everyone is eligible for a chapter 13 bankruptcy. A recent Federal Reserve study has found that the 2005 bankruptcy reforms have actually made bankruptcy an option too expensive for those most in need. 76 Ironically, the best remedy for a zombie foreclosure may not be available in the low-income neighborhoods where most of these foreclosures occur.
Homeowners are often forced to forgo the best remedy for a combination of cobbled-together, second and third best remedies.
III. WHEN BANKRUPTCY IS NOT AN OPTION: KATHLEEN'S STORY
There are frankly no good options for a homeowner who is trying to wrestle free from a zombie loans, especially for the many low income homeowners who are the most likely victims. While the strategies depend largely on what the homeowner is attempting to accomplish, it will soon become clear that those goals must also be flexible.
Kathleen has a classic zombie mortgage. 77 Her efforts to resolve the situation illustrate the complexities of the problem, but also offers some insights into possible solutions. Kathleen, Kathy thought the foreclosure was behind her. She had given the house back to the bank.
She could not have been more wrong. The deed in lieu packet was apparently never processed. Kathleen never received notice of the motion. There was no hearing because the motion implied that the mortgage was current. The motion indicated that "Plaintiff is no longer proceeding with this foreclosure cause due to insufficient value of the subject real estate." At the end of the motion, and in a paragraph that the bank now claims was a clerical error, the lender asked the court to "vacate the Judgment dated November 7, 2012 as the Defendants have since resolved the issues stated in said Complaint and the account is now current." 82 The foreclosure was set aside and the note and mortgage reinstated. Unbeknownst to Kathy, she not only owned the home; she again had a mortgage.
Another year passed and Kathy remained unaware that the property she thought had been returned to the bank via a deed-in-lieu was, in fact, still in her name. In 2014, she was contacted by the city's building code department because the property had fallen into disrepair. It was only then that she discovered she still owned the property. Despite asking her to sign an agreement to surrender the property, the lender had never taken steps to secure the property against vandals.
While it had been unoccupied, all the cabinets and plumbing were removed. The roof had been damaged and mold appeared in the basement. 83 Kathy immediately took steps to secure the property, but remained confused as to how all this had come to pass.
Kathy's story is a classic example of all that goes wrong in a zombie mortgage. It is also, unfortunately, not atypical. Kathy's home had sat vacant for more than three years. The damage has been done. How can you unwind the situation now? Kathy decided she would try to rebuild the home and move back in; but she feared that as soon as she made the property habitable again the bank would re-appear to foreclose. It is important to view this situation through the eyes of a homeowner. What had gone wrong? Kathleen first went to the courthouse where she discovered that the foreclosure had been set aside because, according to the motion to vacate filed by the lender "the loan was now current." This puzzled her because, according to the last information she had received from the bank, she was still in default. She tried to contact the servicer for information but was told they did not have her loan.
a. Request for Information
This is the first roadblock homeowners with zombie loans encounter. Federal regulations allow a homeowner to request information about their loan, including who owns it. 84 However, if the loan was discharged in bankruptcy or if the servicer has not been the servicer for more than a year, the lender does not need to reply to the request. 85 A zombie mortgage is likely to fall into this category. As a result, even if the homeowners are willing and able to do a loan workout, they may not be able to identify who to talk to in order to accomplish this.
The next step is to look in the land records. They will most often reveal the mortgage holder as the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS). MERs was created by the mortgage banking industry to ease the transfer of paper in the buying and selling of mortgages.
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MERS was delegated as "nominee" for the lender and registered the mortgage in the local land recordation system. The loan could then be sold without the need to continually update the mortgage holder. MERS acted as a place holder, or at least that was how the system was intended to work. in a chapter 7 bankruptcy. 93 In some cases, though, a quiet title is the only option left to determine who is the mortgage holder and the extent to which anyone is claiming an interest in the property.
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When the statute of limitations has expired on the note, an action in quiet title would seem clear cut. There is no enforceable debt, so there should be no enforceable lien to support that debt. Unfortunately, the situation is not that simple. At some point after a homeowner goes into default on a mortgage loan the lender will notify him that it will no longer accept monthly payments. Instead, it has accelerated the note and the entire principal balance of the loan is due.
Failure to pay will bring foreclosure.
As previously mentioned, a mortgage loan consists of two documents: the promissory note, nearly always a negotiable instrument, and the mortgage or deed of trust. Determining the statute of limitations for a mortgage loan sometimes means reconciling these two instruments. Chart IV: Examples of serial filings of zombie mortgages None of the above homeowners were aware that either the sale was cancelled or that the foreclosure was subsequently dismissed. In the first, the refiling resulted in a judgment of more than $10,000 greater than the first, all in interest and fees. The second homeowner is still litigating his action, but his second foreclosure appears to have been filed beyond the statute of limitations of the note. Finally, the last homeowner was deceased, so clearly he did not consent to any of the actions in the case. The harm is to the unknown heirs and the integrity of the judicial system. As with the first borrower, the second judgment is larger than the first because of new filing fees and attorney costs.
Step away from the world of foreclosure for a moment. Suppose, instead, the plaintiff is the victim of a car accident who is suing the driver of the other car for damages. He wins an award of $22,644.22, as in our last example above. He then he decides that if he waits a year or two, he might get a better deal. He asks the court to set aside the judgment without prejudice and then he re-files the same action year later, this time obtaining a judgment of $31,754.52. Is there any court in the country that would allow a plaintiff this liberty? No. Jurisprudential rules regarding res judicata and finality of judgments would certainly prevent it. Yet, banks are being allowed to do just this, over and over again across the country.
c. Fraud on the Court
The question must be asked. Why? The most obvious reason, and the reason that plays out when these files are examined, is that the plaintiff/lenders are misrepresenting their actions to the courts. 104 In Kathleen's case, the motion to set aside the judgment represented to the court that the "account was now current."
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The judge, believing that the parties had reached a loan modification, relied on that statement to set aside the judgment. 106 After filing the quiet title, the lender returned to the foreclosing court (coincidentally the same court that is handling the quiet title) and asked that the language in the motion be removed because it was a clerical error. 107 The language may or may not have been a clerical error in Kathleen's case. However, the pattern of these misrepresentations by different lenders and in differing jurisdiction suggests that the decision to misrepresent facts to courts in these cases is no error. This is an intentional strategy to undo foreclosures without tipping off the judiciary as to what is really going on.
Motions to vacate judgments often imply that the parties have resolved their dispute, suggesting to the judicial officer that either the loan was brought current or that a loan modification is in place. Phrases such as "the parties have reached a resolution of all disputed issues," found in one St. Joseph County case, are common. 108 When the homeowner appeared at the hearing in this case, he disputed that a settlement had been reached. The attorney then changed the argument and suggested that the true reason for filing the motion to vacate was "to make it easier for the new attorneys representing our client. Cincinnati, Ohio refiled the foreclosure. 112 The lender had no contact with the bank in between these two filings. 113 In other cases, however, the motivation for the lender's action is less clear. In JP Morgan
Chase v. Pinkert, the lender failed to state any reason for its request to vacate the judgment. 114 In the hearing set by the court on the matter, the attorney first claimed that the judgment needed to be vacated to allow for loss mitigation. 115 He was left scrambling when the judge pointed out that the homeowner was deceased and, therefore, not likely to engage productively in loss mitigation efforts. 116 What is clear from these and numerous other such motions is that the creditor rarely aligns the reason for the request with the court rules that governs such actions. (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b) (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by opposing party (4) the judgement is void (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief. claiming the parties are engaging in loss mitigation with a homeowner when no such efforts were underway was intentionally deceptive. Courts favor loss mitigation efforts and are very inclined to set a aside a judgment to facilitate such activity. Proving an "unconscionable scheme," however, is much more difficult, time consuming and expensive. Frankly, who but a law professor has the time to search thousands of state court records looking for a pattern of deception in the setting aside of zombie mortgages?
The proper way to vacate a judgment is with a motion under Trial Rule 60. 121 Except in rare circumstances, such a motion must be brought within one year of the judgment and must state a reason to justify the action. 122 An allegation of fraud on the court is best raised in opposition to the creditor's motion to vacate the judgment. Homeowners with zombie loans have abandoned their property because they believe it has been foreclosed. Most never receive a copy the motion. These leaves the party best equipped to raise fraud on the court, the court itself.
It is an unusual for a defendant to oppose a motion to set aside a judgment that has been entered against him and, as a result, there is virtually no case law addressing this specific situation. This fact adds to the homeowner's problem. Judges are simply not accustom to a situation where the plaintiff creditor no longer wants a judgment to remain in place and the defendant debtor does. In granting these motions, courts seem to be making the logical, but in this case erroneous, assumption that their action will benefit the defendant, homeowner. They grant the motion, almost always without a hearing.
If, however, the homeowner does gain knowledge of the events, fraud on the court can be an especially useful tool for convincing the court to not only grant the motion to set aside the 121 See Fox, supra note 29 at 46-49 for an extensive discussion of the use and misuse of trial rule 60 in this context 122 Id. In my review of files, I have only seen one instance when rule 60 was cited.
judgment, but also dismiss the foreclosure with prejudice as a sanction for the lender's fraudulent actions. 123 A dismissal with prejudice may prevent the serial foreclosure problem that not only adds to the homeowner's ultimate costs, but wastes precious judicial time and resources. If the motion to vacate the judgment and dismiss the foreclosure action is being made for a legitimate purpose and not simply to postpone the judgment until the bank feels it can achieve a better result, the lender should not object to a dismissal with prejudice.
There are traditionally three ways to raise fraud on the court. 124 A party can file a motion under trial rule 60(b) (3) alleging the fraud. 125 If the homeowner does not discover the subsequent action within a year, the next available method is to file an independent action under 60(b). 126 With zombie mortgages the homeowners will most likely be asking the court to set aside the order granting the motion to vacate. Ironically, their request will actually result in enforcing, as opposed to setting aside, the foreclosure judgment. Finally, if neither of these are available, a court has the inherent power to set aside an order or perhaps refuse to grant it in the first place, if the relief being sought is "procured by fraud on the court." 127 A court can, therefore, set aside its order sua sponte if it discovers a pattern of fraud on the court in the presentation of the motion to vacate judgment. Based on the court's ability to raise this sua sponte, a homeowner should also be able to raise the issue as a shield, not a sword, and ask the court not to grant the motion to vacate the judgment. Foreclosure is an action in equity. 128 Equitable remedies such as the quiet title action previously discussed are the best means for homeowners seeking relief from a zombie mortgage.
Inherent in any equitable claim is the longstanding principal that a person seeking equity must come to the court with clean hands. 129 The doctrine of unclean hands applies both the lender filing the foreclosure and to the homeowner defending it. "Clean hands" can be a tricky doctrine for a homeowner who admits to having defaulted on the loan. 130 In most cases, he will be asking the court to determine who, between the debtor and the creditor, has "cleaner hands."
The doctrine of promissory estoppel provides one option for resolving zombie and stalled mortgages, especially if the goal is to force the lender to complete the foreclosure.
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Restatement (Second) of Contracts §90 defines promissory estoppel as follows:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
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In nearly every stalled, abandoned or zombie mortgage, the homeowners have been misled into believe the home had been foreclosed and they were required to vacate. Kathleen, for example, was induced to move from her home by the lender's promise of a deed in lieu of foreclosure. The homeowner in Kretschmer was misled by the creditor's attorney who induced her not to file an answer to the foreclosure complaint because a short sale would be forthcoming. 133 The
Kretschmer court held that evidence that a homeowner relied on the creditor's promise of settlement and failed to take the action necessary to avoid a default was a sufficient reason to set aside the foreclosure. 134 The Court set aside the default judgment. 135 Defaults are generally disfavored by courts. Therefore, homeowners should be warned. It may be far easier to get a court to set aside a default judgment than it will be to require a lender to take affirmative action, such as ordering it to sell the property. Still, the doctrine remains the same. If the homeowner relied on the promise to his detriment, a remedy should be available.
The proper remedy for promissory estoppel has been debated for many years. One theory holds that the remedy should only compensate the aggrieved party for the damages caused by the reliance. 136 Therefore, a homeowner, who moved from the home should perhaps only be compensated for the damages to the home as a result of that reliance. The opposing theory holds that the proper damages is the same as any other contract, the expected result had the contract been performed. 137 This is a bit harder to conceptualize in this situation.
Presumably, that damage would be to put the homeowner in the same position as if the foreclosure had been completed and the home sold. In a recent study, Professor Jimenez has documented that courts currently seem to favor the later of these two theories. 138 The facts of a zombie mortgage are so unusual for courts, however, makes it is hard to predict how damages will be determined in these cases.
In any case, no discussion of damages is complete without a discussion of the mitigation of damages. This has only recently become an issue in these cases. Once a foreclosure is set aside, there will be a period of time when no payments are accepted, but interest continues to accruing on the loan. The value of the collateral will surely have declined, especially if the property has been abandoned. All of these extra costs to the homeowner or losses to the lender, depending on your perspectives, are directly attributable to the lender's act of starting and then abandoning a foreclosure action. When and if a lender eventually comes back to a homeowner and demands payment or files a subsequent foreclosure action or both, the judgment owed by the homeowner will be much larger than previously.
In Park Tre Investment v. Anderson 139 the lender obtained a foreclosure judgment of $22,644.22. The judgment was set aside and refiled the same month. 140 This second action required a second filing fee, more interest, more attorney's fees and an additional fee for service.
The second judgment, granted 2 months later, was more than $9,000 larger than the first.
Nothing the homeowner did caused the motion to be set aside and then re-filed. In fact, he was
deceased. Yet, the foreclosure judgment has grown by over $9,000. Clearly, the lender sees no reason to mitigate its damages. Courts sitting in equity can fashion remedies as justice provides.
A court's equitable powers must balance this imbalance and require such mitigation.
138 Id. at 708. 139 71-C01-1010-MF-000600; see chart four, infra p.24. 140 71-C01-1010-MF-000600 e. Abandonment
One of the most difficult issues facing homeowners is the fact that they are left with a mortgage on the property and a lender who will neither accept payment nor foreclose on the property. If the situation persists long enough, a homeowner may be able to successfully claim a laches defense to a subsequent foreclosure. 141 This, however, would require a homeowner to wait years before resolving her situation. Most people cannot endure the stress of that alternative.
A novel approach is to ask the court to find that the lender has abandoned the mortgage.
Common law holds that you cannot abandon real property. 142 A mortgage, however, is not real property. Certain rights relating to property can be abandoned. 143 However, in such cases, the owner is permitted to abandon the benefit, but not the burden of the property. 144 Interestingly, what zombie mortgage have shown is that courts are willing to allow mortgage lenders to walk away from all the burden of ownership, while retaining all the benefit. They have it backwards.
Abandonment has traditionally been defined as "intentionally and voluntarily relinquishes all right, title, and interest" in the property. 145 Typically, the intent to abandon is clear. The physical object is simply left somewhere by its owner. 146 Abandoning a nontangible piece of property, such as a mortgage, is more complicated. Intent can, however, be demonstrated by actions of a party. 147 Kathleen's case is a good example of how this intent might manifests itself. The lender first promised to accept a deed in lieu and then failed to follow-through, indicating it had no interest in owning the property. It then foreclosed, but failed to secure or sell the property for a period of years. Again, this signals its intent not to enforce the mortgage. Finally, it asks the court to set aside the judgment because it had no interest in selling the property. Each of these acts demonstrated an affirmative acts to abandon its right to the mortgage.
One of the justification for not allowing the abandonment of real property is that it shifts the burden of that ownership to another party without their consent. In effect, it puts the burden of ownership on an unsuspecting and unwilling party. However, a mortgage is a narrow interest in the land. Professor Eduardo Penalver has suggested that "the abandonment of such narrowly drawn land interests does not seem to generate much by way of harmful consequences for third parties." 148 In fact, it is because the law has not deemed the zombie mortgage abandoned that it has become a "zombie." The zombie has harmed the home owners and entire communities. It has prevented the free alienation of the property that is subject to the mortgage. Scholars have argued that until and unless someone else is willing to take possession of that property, it cannot be abandoned. 149 Ironically, in the case of a zombie loan there homeowners and communities willing to accept the responsibility of the property, but are prevented because the lender's mortgage. The lender is receiving the benefit of the mortgage, but discharging all the responsibility to others. By far the best and most efficient means to clean up the zombie loans that have plagues the country since the beginning of this crisis is to consider the mortgages on 147 Id. 148 Id. at 212. 149 Id. at 203.
those properties abandoned. Homeowners and communities can then more easily move in to deal with the related, abandoned properties.
IV. CONCLUSION
The securitization of the mortgage loans has changed how lenders respond in a time of mortgage crisis. As a result, numerous homeowners have found themselves in the clutches of a zombie loan, a loan that is neither living nor dead. Current law and policy has struggled with how to deal with this new crisis. It is clear that both need to modernize in response.
Policymakers need to acknowledge the changing landscape. Homeowners have the right to know who owns their loan, how much is owed on that debt and who to contact when that debt is in default. This right should continue beyond charge-off until and unless it is completely dead.
On a practical level, this means notifying consumers when a debt is sold and to whom.
The judiciary needs to exercise its equitable powers to curb the abuse. These powers include the ability to hold lenders accountable when they misrepresent facts to the homeowner and the courts. A lender who consistently fails to exercise its right to enforce its lien should be deemed to have abandoned it. The unencumbered property can then return to the world of commerce to be sold, repaired or destroyed, if necessary.
Finally, communities need to work with homeowners to achieve these ends. Most homeowners who become aware of a zombie loan do so as a result of a code enforcement proceeding. Municipalities should work with these homeowners, most of whom relied in good faith on information from their lender before they moved, to hold the proper party accountable for the plague of zombie mortgages left in the wake of this last foreclosure crisis. The lenders and their servicers created these zombies. They, and not homeowners and communities, should bear the burden of exterminating them.
